Hydro One latest financials look positive — until you look beneath the surface

Lots of “spin” in a recent news release. 2019 doesn’t look so rosy

On February 21, 2019 Hydro One issued a press release announcing their fourth quarter and year-end 2018 results.

The market shrugged.

That was in spite of the spin of the release titled “Hydro One Reports Positive Fourth Quarter Results”. Some media reports echoed the Hydro One press release without, I presume, looking at the financial statements.

Because if one were to examine their results for the quarter, it is obvious why the market shrugged. Revenue (net of purchased power) was up by $41 million (5.3%) due to higher demand for electricity for the transmission (up 2.5%) and distribution (up 3.2%) businesses. Offsetting the increased demand and related revenue, was a year over year $64 million increase (26.2%) in OMA (operations maintenance and administration) costs for the comparable 2017 quarter.

The jump in after-tax net income to $162 million from$155 million, attributable to shareholders, was up $7 million or 4.5%. However, if it hadn’t been for a huge drop in income taxes (from $38 million in 2017 to only $1 million in 2018’s fourth quarter), Hydro One’s results would have been upsetting to shareholders.

If Hydro One had taken the hit related to the “termination fee” (US$ 103 million) payable to Avista shareholders on the failed acquisition of that company, Hydro One would have reported a loss for the quarter. This is based on Note 4 which stated: “On February 1, 2019, Hydro One entered into a credit agreement for a $170 million unsecured demand operating credit facility (Demand Facility) for the purpose of funding the payment of the termination fee payable to Avista Corporation as a result of the termination of the Merger Agreement and other Merger related costs.”

The first Quarter results of 2019 will presumably reflect the unaccounted-for cost of the termination fee.

While year-over-year results report a favourable trend with revenues (net of purchased power) up 6.5% or $204 million, it was mainly driven by higher demand for distribution customers (revenue up 2.1 %) and higher peak demand for transmission clients (revenue up 11.1%).  If Hydro One had taken the Avista “termination fee” hit of $170 million, net income for shareholders would have been below 2017’s reported $658 million instead of the $778 million (up 18.2%) claimed for 2018.  It’s all about the spin!

Needless to say, scanning the notes to the financial statement indicates Hydro One received rate application approvals from the OEB (Ontario Energy Board) that will affect both their distribution and transmission customers on a go-forward basis. Additional rate applications await rulings from the OEB.

It would appear Hydro One may well experience a decline in profitability in 2019 due to the $170 million Avista termination fee. Additionally, the possibility of reduced demand may surface as ratepayers will not see a repeat of the 25% Fair Hydro Act’s deferral which may have played a role in increased consumption.

We shouldn’t expect the Ford government to deliver the other 12% reduction promised leading up to their election in June 2018 as their accomplishments so far, on this file, have been quite disappointing. They failed to cancel wind and solar contracts that will impact future rate increases.

It appears the former Hydro One CEO has impacted shareholders and possibly ratepayers considerably more than the “Six-Million-Dollar” cost suggested by Premier Ford. While the current Hydro One’s Board of Directors has agreed to restrict the pay to a new CEO to a maximum of $1.5 million per annum it would take 35 years to recoup just the Avista termination costs. An unlikely event!

An ongoing concern is the possible effect on ratepayers, should Hydro One submit a request for a rate increase to the OEB (Ontario Energy Board) to cover the above Avista termination fee and other (already expensed) related costs for the boondoggle.

Ratepayers should hope — and expect — the Minister responsible (Greg Rickford) will issue a clear directive to the OEB instructing them to not grant a rate increase to cover those costs! He should do that despite the province still being a 47% shareholder of Hydro One.

PARKER GALLANT

Hydro One shareholders happy with Avista purchase denial

Avista shareholders, not so much

The Hydro One press release immediately following the decision by the State of Washington’s regulator denying them the right to acquire Avista Corporation was short but expressed “extreme disappointment.”

“TORONTO and SPOKANE, WA, Dec. 5, 2018 /CNW/ – Hydro One Limited (“Hydro One”) (TSX: H) and Avista Corporation (“Avista”) today received a regulatory decision from the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (UTC), denying the proposed merger of the two companies. The companies are extremely disappointed in the UTC’s decision, are reviewing the order in detail and will determine the appropriate next steps.”

How did investors view the denial? Avista shareholders were definitely in the “extremely disappointed” crowd as their shares tumbled, but Hydro One investors were probably “extremely happy” as their shares had one of their very best days ever!

Remember, Hydro One offered to purchase Avista shares well over book value and at a high multiple to earnings ratio.  While the prior Board of Directors of Hydro One and then CEO Mayo Schmidt, along with Glenn Thibeault, former Minister of Energy, were excited about the offer to purchase Avista, it certainly appears that shareholders weren’t!

Some media blame “political interference” by Premier Ford as the principal reason for the denial! One such individual was quoted in CBC article stating: “Ontario Liberal finance critic Mitzie Hunter said Ford’s “reckless conduct” at Hydro One continues to damage the province’s interests.” Apparently Hydro One’s investors are not buying Mitzie’s claim!

There will, however, be a cost to Hydro One. When the purchase was negotiated, they agreed to a “termination fee” of US$ 103 million (CAD$ 139 million) and will have to pay that to Avista for distribution to their shareholders.  Hydro One will also have to unwind foreign exchange forward contracts and accumulated acquisition costs which will be expensed.  They also have to deal with the large convertible debenture issue ($1,540 million) which has a 10-year maturity and interest payments above market rates prior to conversion.

I assume we ratepayers will have to sit on the sidelines until Hydro One’s year-end report in early 2019 is issued before we get an estimate on the costs of the denial by the State of Washington’s regulator.

We can then hope our regulator, the Ontario Energy Board (OEB), doesn’t grant a rate increase to Hydro One to cover the costs of their ill-considered attempt to acquire a company 3,200 kilometres away at an inflated price.

Only time will tell.

PARKER GALLANT

Who is the real hypocrite in electricity sector?

Hydro One and a little distributor in Niagara On The Lake have different ways of doing business … and serving customers

Niagara On The Lake Hydro president Tim Curtis: honest effort for customers

February 20, 2018

It is interesting to compare a relatively small Ontario-based local electricity distribution company (LDC) against a much larger one such as Hydro One. If you do, you get some idea of what’s behind rate-paying electricity customers concerns.

Niagara-on-the-Lake Hydro (NOTL) had the gall recently to brazenly ask, Are we hypocrites?  They asked that question because they installed 70 kW of solar panels on the roof of their building and it will, at 15% generation capacity, produce revenue of about $21,400 annually.  Their news release made this bold statement:

“A reasonable question to ask is whether the Board of NOTL Energy can be considered hypocrites for accepting a FIT contract while they publicly called for the cancellation of the FIT and MicroFIT programs? 

“The short answer is, yes, we are hypocrites.”

Now, contrast NOTL’s honesty with Hydro One and their efforts to convince U.S. electricity regulators they are deserving of acquiring Avista. It’s a strange path Hydro One is taking. Hydro One CEO Mayo Schmidt recently traveled to Juneau, Alaska to plea for approval in respect to Avista’s ownership of Alaska Electric Light & Power Company.  Their appeal included a 444-page submission to the Regulatory Commission of Alaska, one of several required to convince regulators in four western states that the takeover of Avista would not negatively affect customers.

So it wasn’t a private island in the Caribbean Schmidt traveled to, but hopefully Ontario ratepayers won’t be picking up the tab for Schmidt et al in their efforts to win approval for Hydro One’s Avista takeover.

But we are paying: Hydro One’s December 31, 2017 Financial Statement was released February 13, 2018 and had an unusual “after tax” income claim of $36 million on page 34 referenced as: “Costs related to acquisition of Avista Corporation”.   Accounting rules allow Hydro One to claim expenditures related to Schmidt’s travel costs along with consultant and legal fees plus prep time for submissions made to the regulators in the states where Avista operates. As a result, Hydro One reported “Adjusted Net Income” of $694 million versus $721 million in 2016. Putting aside the $36 million, net income was actually down $63 million, or 8.7%.

Also, as a result of the dividend increase announced in May 2017 (quarterly at 22 cents per share), the payout of the 4^th Quarter net income of $155 million (net of the above Avista expenditures of $36 million) resulted in a payout ratio of 89% (in excess of the maximum of 80% announced) of quarterly income — that doesn’t leave much for the oft-touted reinvestment in infrastructure.

Also evident in the Financial Statement is the fact the Ontario Provincial Government received $150 million less by way of dividend payments in 2017 compared to 2016. That $150 million could have covered interest payments on over $4 billion of the provincial debt!

An interesting feature in Hydro One’s annual report is the first 15 pages are devoted to telling the reader how wonderful the company is and how much progress has been achieved. For example is the claim of customer satisfaction climbing to 71%. It is probably fair to assume this “climb” occurred after the launch of the “Fair Hydro Plan” which kicked up to 31% of “electricity costs” down the road, but promised electricity customers a 25% chop off their bills right now.   As a de facto monopoly, perhaps 71% customer satisfaction is somehow good? Forgotten in the bragging process is the fact Hydro One are spending $15 million to give their customers prettier bills containing less information. The $15 million spend is included in one of several outstanding rate application increases filed with the Ontario Energy Board.

So brave little Niagara On the Lake Hydro will increase spending and increase revenues (slightly) meaning less pressure on increased delivery rates, but Hydro One spends on frills that will increase pressure on their clients’ delivery rates.

I will let the reader decide which of the two local distribution companies is the true hypocrite.

 

Hydro One: the news is bad, bad and even worse

Hydro One’s litany of bad news

Shortly after Hydro One’s CEO Mayo Schmidt announced in July that Hydro One would acquire Avista Corporation of Spokane, Washington, it’s been a litany of bad news for him and the shareholders.

Bad News # 1.

The worst bad news was a recent one by the OEB in respect to the allocation of a large part of Hydro One’s rate increase request, associated with deferred income tax relative to their transmission business.   The note in their recently released 3^rd Quarter report states: “On November 9, 2017, the OEB issued a Decision and Order that modified the portion of the tax savings that should be shared with ratepayers. This proposed methodology would result in an impairment of Hydro One Networks’ transmission deferred income tax regulatory asset of up to approximately $515 million. If the OEB were to apply the same methodology for sharing in Hydro One Networks’ 2018-2022 distribution rates, for which a decision is currently outstanding, it would result in an impairment of Hydro One Networks’ distribution deferred income tax regulatory asset of up to approximately $370 million.”

Hydro One was not pleased and as a result are appealing the ruling by the OEB to the Ontario Court of Appeals. They hope the decision will result in a 100% benefit for the shareholders and nothing for the ratepayers instead of the 29% allocated by the OEB.

Bad News # 2. and # 3.

Another bit of recent bad news was related to the ruling of the Alaskan regulators who  rejected the acquisition of Alaska Electric Light and Power Company (an Avista subsidiary) by Hydro One.  Interestingly enough, the rejection came even though Hydro One have guaranteed the regulators (via the Avista Corporation’s application to allow the takeover) a 10-year rate reduction which is estimated to reduce Avista’s revenue by US$31 million.

Bad News # 4.

Almost six months ago, Hydro One submitted a rate application to the OEB that, if fully granted, would increase average residential distribution rates by $141 annually. This was right in the midst of all the chatter about the Fair Hydro Plan the Ontario government was promoting.  When confronted with questions related to that application, the Premier declared to the Elliot Lake Standard: “It’s the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) that sets the rates. The Ontario Energy Board sometimes accepts increases and sometimes they don’t.”  Most ratepayers know that setting rate increases has become the purview of the Minister of Energy and the Premier who decreed rates would be reduced by 25% via the Fair Hydro Act so the claim was disingenuous.  Nevertheless, perhaps the OEB took a signal from the Premier’s message?  What they did was schedule a series of open-house meetings at nine locations in the province.  One should suspect those attending the meetings were not there to support the rate increases!  The OEB is still weighing the Hydro One submission and what they heard at the community events.

Bad News # 5.

Yet another piece of recent bad news came from Spokane, Washington when Avista announced their 3^rd Quarter earnings were down 63% from US$12.2million to US$4.5million of the comparable 2016 Quarter. (Could someone please tell me why Hydro One is buying Avista Corp. and paying [US $5.3 million] 45 times current earnings, suggesting there are synergies that will result in savings and benefits to both sets of ratepayers separated by 3,687 km of driving miles?)

Bad News # 6.

Back in August 2016 the City of Orillia agreed to sell Orillia Power Distribution for $26.3 million (30 times 2015 earnings) and Hydro One dutifully submitted the agreement to the OEB for approval. Shortly after Hydro One announced their planned purchase of Avista, the OEB stated “In an order dated July 27, the board said it had determined “that the hearing of this application will be adjourned until the OEB renders its decision on Hydro One’s distribution rate application.”  Energy board staff found that rates proposed for previously acquired utilities in Hydro One’s distribution rate application

“suggest large distribution rate increases for some customers” in future.”  Hydro One resubmitted the application and the OEB’s response was: “On October 24, 2017, the OEB issued a Procedural Order in response to Hydro One’s Motion to Review and Vary, with key dates for filing additional materials on the Motion, hearing date, and filing of reply submissions.”

 Bad News # 7

On November 10, 2017 Hydro One released their 3^rd Quarter results: they were disappointing, with distributed power dropping by 395 GWh (gigawatt hours) or 6% compared to the same quarter in 2016. That reflected itself in a revenue drop of 3.7% or $14 million (net of cost of power) despite additional revenue coming from OEB approved rate increases.  The overall drop in consumption in the province also reflected itself in a significant drop in average peak demand (down 9.3%) which would have resulted in a revenue drop if not for the OEB’s approval of transmission rate increases, pushing revenue up by $27 million.

The end result was a $15 million (-6.3%) drop in net income despite the year over year rate increases for both the distribution and transmission businesses. Interestingly Hydro One blamed “milder weather” as the cause of the consumption and peak demand drops whereas Environment Canada reported “From June 20 to July 31, Toronto hit 30 degrees just seven times, compared with 24 days in 2016” but perhaps “milder weather” insofar as Hydro One is concerned references cooler weather or simply reduced consumption due to the cost burden on ratepayers?

 Perhaps the stream of bad news that Hydro One is currently suffering from will allow the company’s executives time to reflect on the decade of bad news Ontario’s ratepayers have experienced as a result of their inability to keep our rates from climbing at a multiple of the cost of living.

Parker Gallant,

November 14, 2017

 

Hydro One’s scorecard: not a winner

Lose, lose, lose … and more losses to come

Hydro One 2016 Scorecard highlights shortfalls

 

 On several occasions, I’ve expounded on the decision by then Energy Minister Dwight Duncan in July 2004 to direct the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) to instruct all LDC (local distribution companies) to install “smart meters”^*   The Premier’s October 2005 throne speech included the comment:  “Consumers can look forward to getting smart meters that will help them save money by telling them when they can pay less.” 

I believe most ratepayers know how McGuinty’s claim worked out: over the past 12 years, our electricity bills have shot up and the Hydro One billing problems were top of mind in the media for many Hydro One in the province, thanks to Andre Marin when he was Ombudsman and thanks to  Ontario’s Auditor General. Those billing problems were caused by the inability of Hydro One to read many smart meters; and, installation costs were double ($2 billion) the budgeted costs, as noted by in the AG in her December 2014 report.

While Hydro One customers have been assuaged with claims the problems with smart meters have been fixed, if one examines their 2016 Scorecard submitted to the OEB it is obvious they are still dealing with issues.  Under the heading “Billing Issues” is this: “The Company’s continued improvement is mainly attributable to ongoing business process optimization, investing in the smart meter network to expand and replace various network support tools, and a continued focus on addressing smart meters that do not meet the necessary quality levels.”

Oh dear.

Further on, under the heading “Asset Management” is this remark in respect to why Hydro One exceeded its planned investment: “Hydro One is replacing meters because its service provider is phasing out network cellular technology by April 2018. The new meters align with the service provider’s new technology and prevent loss of data communication between Hydro One and its customers.”   

Garbage day

Hydro One obviously doesn’t want to encounter the negativity of future billing problems so, now, the expensive meters they installed just a few years ago are being tossed in the waste bin. The cost of the replacements has caused them to ask for further rate increases.

Despite the spending on “smart meters” past and present, Hydro One’s “Customer Satisfaction Survey Results” keep trending down despite their claim of higher billing accuracy according to the Scorecard.

Hydro One also shows a lack of leadership in the “Scorecard’s” System Reliability in both the “Average Number of Hours that Power to a Customer is Interrupted” and the “Average Number of Times that Power to a Customer is Interrupted.”

Scoring high in one area, at least

Yet another very disconcerting leadership role in evidence in the Scorecard is under “Financial Ratios” where Hydro One shows their “Leverage: Total Debt (includes short-term and long-term debt) to Equity Ratio” at 1.46 to 1. That means it ranks as the sixth highest leveraged LDC.   With their plans to purchase Avista their debt will increase substantially ($4 billion), raising this ratio further, and impacting Ontario’s ratepayers in respect to possible credit rating downgrades and the resulting increased borrowing costs.

So far, we see no discernible benefits to Hydro One’s ratepayers — only more costs.

 

Sidebar: Amazingly, Hydro One claims on the Scorecard they scored brilliantly in hooking up MicroFit contracted parties where the excessive cost of what the parties are paid are picked up by all of the other ratepayers of Ontario.

* For more background view this article: Hydro One’s failure to communicate rewarded with rate increase

 

Hydro One claims it is enhancing consumer satisfaction (and pigs are flying)

It’s all good news! Or, is it?

Reading the news releases since Hydro One was privatized by the Wynne government one would think the company is trending up. A rate-paying customer, or even an early investor in Hydro One shares, however, might not agree, especially with some recent claims in their second quarter news release.

Right after Hydro One announced plans to spend $6.7 billion (CAD) to acquire Avista Corporation of Spokane, Washington, credit rating agencies Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s revised their outlook to “negative” from stable, citing concern about cash flow and increased debt.  Fast forward to August 8, 2017 and the second quarter results demonstrated more negative news as earnings dropped $34 million (21.7%) to $123 million or 20 cents per share.  Back on May 4, 2017 Hydro One had increased their dividend payment to 22 cents per share so they paid out $135 million in the Q2, or $12 million more than their after-tax income.

I wonder how long the credit rating agencies will allow that to happen without a downgrade.

It appears that management of Hydro One at least recognized the “outlook” downgrade as, buried in the notes in their Q2, was this :  “The change in the capital structure of Hydro One as a result of the Merger and the Debenture Offering could cause credit rating agencies which rate the outstanding debt obligations of Hydro One and Hydro One Inc. to re-evaluate and potentially downgrade their current credit ratings, which could increase the Company’s borrowing costs.”

The news release also featured this back-pat from president and CEO Mayo Schmidt, despite the bad news of the quarter and the potential of an upcoming credit downgrade: “We continued to deliver on enhancing customer satisfaction and value while implementing operational improvements and efficiency gains across the organization, despite unseasonably mild weather during the second quarter.”

Not too bright a future

So, let me get this straight: a possible credit downgrade, higher borrowing costs, declining income and lower demand — those don’t add up to “enhancing customer satisfaction and value.” And, with nine rate applications to be filed in the next four years, the future doesn’t look great for Hydro One’s customers.

Hydro One’s distribution revenues (net of purchased power) were flat at $349 million compared to the same 2016 Quarter. However, they actually delivered 4.5% (276,000 MWh) fewer MWh. What that means is Hydro One’s distribution rates for their most recent quarter were 4.5% higher than the comparable quarter in order to make up for the lower demand while maintaining revenue levels.

To make matters worse, the takeover of Avista will put Hydro One into the coal business facing a $100 million dollar cost of cleaning up a toxic waste site partially owned by Avista in Montana.

Effective management and efficiency gains, coupled with lower distribution rates should be the focus for Hydro One before they get to claim they are “enhancing customer satisfaction.”  As well, claiming that electricity rates are lower by actually deferring costs for four years via the Fair Hydro Act just proves Hydro One’s existence as a monopoly should be controlled, rather than allowed to spin tall tales.